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2 abstract
This research analyzes the main determinants of the net interest margin of banks 
operating in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in the period from 
1999 to 2010. The results reveal several main drivers of net interest margins in the 
CEE. Prior to 2008 the net interest margins declined primarily due to strong ca-
pital inflows and stable macroeconomic environment. In the crisis period, signifi-
cant rise in government debt accompanied by the increase in macroeconomic 
risks and abating capital inflows were pushing margins up while other factors 
such as low credit demand, higher capitalization and significantly increased share 
of non-performing loans pressured banks’ margins down. The results also confirm 
the important contribution of higher efficiency to lowering banks’ margins. 
Keywords: net interest margin, CEE
1 introduction
The past few years in some of the Central and Eastern European1 (CEE) countries 
have been marked by an ongoing debate among politicians, the financial industry 
academic community and the general public about banking sector profitability, 
which has been characterized both as too high and too low, depending on the point 
of view. There have also been many opposite opinions about the role of banks and 
their ability to promote the recovery of the real economy, especially in countries 
where credit activity is stagnating or is very low. In that context, one of the main 
questions raised has been related to the banks’ and policymakers’ options of lowe-
ring domestic interest rates and stimulating demand for credit in such a way. 
The cost of financial intermediation is an important determinant of total financing 
costs. According to the literature (i.e. Maudos and de Guevarra, 2004; Claeys and 
Vander Vennet, 2008; Kasman et al., 2010) there is a strong connection between 
the degree and cost of financial intermediation and economic growth, as funding 
costs have a significant impact on the investment level and capital allocation, and 
thus in turn on growth potential and the direction of economic activity. They also 
affect the profitability of the banking sector and therefore its stability and ability 
to support the real economy (García-Herrero, Gavilá and Santabárbara, 2009).
In spite of the importance of borrowing conditions for economic recovery and, in 
turn, for financial system stability, this area has not been researched extensively 
with respect to CEE countries in the period during and after the onset of the recent 
financial crisis. Most of the papers studying the net interest margins in these 
countries focus on the period of banking sector consolidation in the early 2000s 
and the post-consolidation period, which has been marked by a successful tran-
sformation of those banks into modern, market-oriented financial institutions. Ho-
wever, the recent crisis, marked by a severe slowdown and drop in real GDP and 
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3mostly very slow (if any) recovery combined with very mild credit activity of 
commercial banks, has drawn lots of attention to the interconnectedness between 
financial institutions and the real economy.
Banks charge and pay many types of interest rates and have a variety of different 
categories of assets and liabilities and there is no unique way of measuring the 
difference between what they charge for lending and the price of their funding 
sources. One of the best and most widely used indicator of the cost and efficiency 
of financial intermediation is a bank’s net interest margin. It is calculated as the 
ratio of net interest income and total bank earning assets, where net interest 
income is equal to the difference between interest earned and interest paid. Re-
gardless of its common use, it should be noted that this indicator has some poten-
tial weaknesses, as it does not take into account other sources of income and costs 
for the bank and is not good representative of a bank’s marginal costs and reve-
nues (for details see Brock and Suarez, 2000). 
Higher net interest margins usually imply lower banking sector efficiency, marked 
by higher costs due to inefficient control of operating expenses, and have a nega-
tive impact on financial developments, resulting with lower investments and slo-
wer economic activity. They might also reflect a high risk premia due to inappro-
priate regulation of the banking sector or a significant information asymmetry 
(Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008). On the other hand, lower net interest margins 
usually mark deeper and more developed financial markets, encourage investment 
activities and support economic growth. However, as emphasized by Schweiger 
and Liebeg (2009), the benefits of a lower cost of financial intermediation will 
only be effectuated if banks price risks in a prudent manner.
From banks’ perspective, the net interest margin is an important determinant of 
their profitability, while from the real economy point of view, combined with the 
country risk, macroeconomic variables, client risk, competition, etc. it is one of 
the key factors influencing the overall level of interest rates for the private sector. 
In bank-centric systems dominant in European emerging markets where bank lo-
ans are the main funding source, factors that affect loan availability also influence 
the stability of the whole banking sector. 
This research aims to find the main determinants of the net interest margin in ele-
ven CEE countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The total sample 
consists of 12 periods (from 1999 to 2010) and 152 cross sections (banks). We are 
particularly interested to find out how bank-specific variables are important for 
the level of net interest margin compared to the specific conditions in the country 
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4 One of the main contributions of this paper to the existing literature is its analysis 
of the period after the onset of the financial crisis, which has not yet been done for 
this region. Apart from that, we use the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM 
estimator, which solves endogeneity problems and allows for the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable together with fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Unlike most other papers dealing with CEE countries, we also take 
into account regulatory costs. 
The results reveal several main drivers of net interest margins in CEE. Prior to 
2008 the net interest margins declined primarily due to strong capital inflows and 
the stable macroeconomic environment. In the crisis period, a significant rise in 
government debt accompanied by the increase in macroeconomic risks and abated 
capital inflows pushed margins up while other factors such as low demand (due to 
weak economic performance), higher capitalization and significantly increased 
share of non-performing loans pressured banks’ margins down. The results also 
confirm the important contribution of higher efficiency to lowering banks’ mar-
gins. This leads to the conclusion that policymakers can influence the costs of fi-
nancial intermediation by conducting prudent and sustainable policies aimed at 
preventing and mitigating risk accumulation and creating a stable macroeconomic 
environment, accordingly indirectly supporting economic activity. 
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. Section two summarizes 
the main findings from the literature investigating the main determinants of banks’ 
profitability and costs of financial intermediation. The third section describes the 
data used in the empirical part of the paper, section four gives an overview of 
stylized facts, while the methodology is explained in the fifth part. The main re-
sults and robustness checks are presented in section six. Concluding remarks, as 
well as some policy implications based on the research outcome, are provided in 
the seventh section.
2 literature survey
Table A1 (in the appendix) presents some of the most relevant research papers that 
study banks’ efficiency and the cost of financial intermediation. The main question 
posed in the literature relates to the fundamental elements that influence the cost 
of financial intermediation. The literature identifies several prime drivers of net 
interest margins (managerial efficiency, macroeconomic volatility and competi-
tive pressures). Regarding policy-related questions, the literature has looked into 
the role of macroeconomic, financial stability and regulatory policies as determi-
nants of interest margins. For instance, one question relates to potential role of 
central banks in lowering interest rate volatility (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000) 
or the role of banking sector regulation in fostering market competition, building 
up stronger capital adequacy rules, lowering credit risk and thereby affecting net 
interest margins (e.g. Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008; Maudos and de Guevara, 
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5In terms of the empirical framework most of the papers base their empirical rese-
arch on the microeconomic dealership model introduced by Ho and Saunders 
(1981), who view the bank as a dealer facing uncertainty and costs coming from 
the stochastic nature of loan demand and deposit inflows, which are covered by 
different fees. There are three empirical approaches in estimating this model, de-
pending on the availability of the data and the interest of the researchers. 
The first approach is based on a two-step procedure, where in the first step the net 
interest margins are regressed on a set of bank specific explanatory variables. The 
resulting constant in this regression is a measure of the pure interest margin for the 
country in question, which is calculated for each time period. In the second step, 
the time series of pure interest rate spread is regressed on the second set of expla-
natory variables: macroeconomic variables, interest rates and their volatility. The 
constant term in this step reflects the effects of market structure on the spread de-
termination after bank specific and macroeconomic effects have been cleaned out. 
Such an approach is characteristic of a single-country analysis with long time se-
ries (Brock and Suarez, 2000; Saunders and Schumacher, 2000; and Männasoo, 
2010). In Männasoo (2010) second step regression is done by vector error corre-
ction model.
The second type of empirical approach was to use the single step approach and 
estimate a reduced equation that depicts the banks’ behaviour with respect to va-
rious determinants of net interest margin. This approach has been mainly used in 
cross-country studies, where in addition to bank and banking market specific va-
riables researchers also include macroeconomic variables to capture the effect of 
banks’ country of operation characteristics. Apart from that, the variables used are 
the same as those in the previous approach. In terms of estimation techniques, this 
approach uses estimates on a pooled dataset, generalized least squares or least 
squares with fixed effects (Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008; Maudos and de Gue-
vara, 2004; Kasman et al., 2010; and Hasan Khan and Khan, 2010). 
The third type of empirical approach builds on the second, but extends it empiri-
cally. Several potential problems are addressed here. The first is that the net inte-
rest margins show a tendency to persist over time, which could be a sign of com-
petitive position of the bank, serially correlated macroeconomic shocks and infor-
mation opacity (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). An additional problem could be 
endogeneity. As García-Herrero et al. (2009) explain, more profitable banks may 
be able to increase their equity more easily by retaining profits or they could invest 
in advertising campaigns to increase size, which can increase their profitability. 
Finally, as before, the researcher needs to take care of unobservable heterogeneity 
which is usually controlled by using fixed effects. This is why some authors opted 
for the GMM estimator which solves these problems (García-Herrero, Gavilá and 
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6 Apart from the net interest margin some authors use different variables as an alter-
native proxy for bank profitability and cost of financial intermediation such as 
return on average assets (ROAA) and return on average equity (ROAE) (Athana-
soglou, Delis and Staikouras, 2006; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011).
The literature surveyed shows that the characteristics of the individual banks are 
among the most important determinants of banks’ business results and financing 
costs for their clients. Variables most commonly used for this purpose are different 
items (or their ratios) from financial and other reports that measure operational 
efficiency, quality of management, income structure, balance-sheet structure, cre-
dit activity, capital adequacy, liquidity, risk aversion, loan quality, credit risk, in-
terest risk, opportunity costs of bank reserves, as well as bank size and ownership 
structure.
Conclusions about the impact of macroeconomic conditions on interest margins 
and banking sector efficiency have been ambiguous. Uncertainty and deteriora-
tion in macroeconomic conditions might increase interest margins and vice versa, 
but as mentioned by Claeys and Vander Vennet (2004), higher economic growth 
could also result in higher interest margins due to more intense credit activity and 
better loan quality. One of the things most authors agree on is that lower inflation 
implies lower interest margins. 
Due to the problems with measurement, few papers explore the impact of regula-
tory costs on the cost of financial intermediation. Ho and Saunders (1981) empha-
size that the cost of banks’ funds is affected not only by the level of reserve requi-
rements, but also by the opportunity cost of holding reserves usually measured by 
short-term risk free rate. Brock and Suarez (2000) and Saunders and Schumacher 
(2000) agree that higher reserve requirements get translated into higher interest 
spreads.
The influence of banking market structure on banks’ efficiency has been investi-
gated in many papers and is commonly measured by the Herfindahl index2 or 
Lerner index3. Specific features of the banking markets influence the market po-
wer of each specific bank and impact the pricing policy, and therefore can 
pressure net interest margins. This implies that a more competitive environment 
should be able to support lower interest margins, but as mentioned in Dietrich and 
Wanzenried (2011), higher concentration might also be a consequence of a strong 
competition among banks and therefore result in lower interest margins. Another 
way of looking at the impact of competition, as noted by Claeys and Vander Ven-
net (2004) and Schweiger and Liebeg (2009), is that it might encourage banks to 
take a higher risk or not price it adequately, resulting in suboptimal interest mar-
gins and potentially leading to the instability of the whole banking sector.
2 Sum of the squares of market shares in total assets of the individual banks.
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73 data and selected variables 
We analyse banks from 11 CEE countries, and the sample consists of 12 periods 
(from 1999 to 2010) and 152 cross sections. For the full sample this gives the 
minimum of 823 observations, after the missing bank-year items were deleted. 
Table 1 lists the data used together with the sources and descriptions. Before the 
econometric analysis the data were revised and checked for extreme values and 
possible reporting errors. Table A2 in the appendix presents descriptive statistics 
for the panel data set used in the analysis. All variables have also been checked for 
stationarity using panel unit root test (table A3), but it is important to note that due 
to limited time dimensions these tests might have a low power.
The dependent variable in the empirical part of research is the net interest margin. 
It measures the cost and efficiency of financial intermediation and is determined 
by the variables that can be influenced by a bank’s management, as well as by 
environmental variables that are primarily features of the market and country 
where the bank operates, mostly outside the management’s control. 
Explanatory variables are divided into three groups: bank specific variables, 
country specific macroeconomic characteristics and banking market specific va-
riables (table 1).
While measuring the impact of the bank specific variables we focus on several 
major factors that contribute to the bank’s performance: efficiency in conducting 
its operations, risk, leverage, possible substitution between interest and non-inte-
rest revenues and finally, benefits of the economy of scale.
Cost to income ratio measures the banks’ efficiency. This variable shows how 
expensive it is for a bank to produce a unit of operating income in terms of costs 
not related to interest expense. It is expected that banks with high unit costs req-
uire higher margins in order to cover these expenses (Maudos and de Guevara, 
2004), while at the same time higher operational efficiency allows banks to lower 
interest margins through lower loan rates or higher deposit rates (Claeys and Van-
der Vennet, 2008). 
Banks might be willing to forgo part of their interest income if they substitute 
other forms of income for it, i.e. fees and commissions on other services. As found 
by Kasman et al. (2010), this substitution effect might be very important in explai-
ning the level of net interest margin. This is why some banks have lower interest 
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Net interest income divided  
by average earning assets. Net 
interest income is defined as  









Measure of operating efficiency 
is calculated as the ratio of  
sum of personnel expenses and 
operating expenses such as 
depreciation, amortisation, 
administrative expenses, 
occupancy costs, software  
costs, operating lease rentals, 
audit and professional fees and 
other operating expenses of an 
administrative nature and 
operating income before 
provisions. Measures costs  
of running the bank as 





Total capital adequacy measure. 
It combines Tier 1 and Tier 2 
capital as a percentage of risk 
weighted assets. Proxy for a 








Measures the revenues the banks 
have from other services such  
as fees and commissions. Higher 
revenue from such sources  
might be a compensation for 
lower interest revenues.
BankScope –




This liquidity or funding ratio 
indicates to what extent the 
bank’s relatively illiquid loans 
are funded by relatively stable 
customer deposits rather than 








A higher ratio implies better 
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GDP growth % Growth rate of real GDP. Eurostat +
Current 
account %
Ratio of current account  
balance to GDP. Eurostat +
Government 
debt %
Ratio of general government 
consolidated debt to GDP. Eurostat +









Spreads on international 
government bonds, own 
calculation based on Merrill 





Calculated as the ratio of bank 
reserves held at central bank and 
M3, this variable serves as a 
proxy for a part of the regulatory 
costs.
IFS +
Credit risk belongs to the group of factors with the highest impact on banks’ inte-
rest margins (Schweiger and Liebeg, 2009; Saad and El-Moussawi, 2010). Fol-
lowing Maudos and de Guevara (2004) and Kasman et al. (2010), it is proxied by 
the ratio of loans to total assets. Banks are expected to charge higher interest rates 
in order to compensate for higher credit risk. In that context, Athanasoglou, Delis 
and Staikouras (2006) emphasize the importance of credit risk management, 
which has not always been appropriate in the SEE region.
The ratio of loans to customer deposits represents a proxy for the liquidity risk, 
which has become particularly significant during the financial crisis when the in-
terbank market was almost frozen and marked by liquidity hoarding, a drop in 
volume and an increase in the interbank interest rates in the EU (Heider, Hoerova 
and Holthausen, 2009; Gabrielli, 2010). Apart from that, banks in the CEE count-
ries might have also been affected by deleveraging as their owners need to fulfil 
tougher capital requirements4. The impact of this ratio on the net interest margin 
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10 can be ambiguous, depending on whether deposits are cheaper than wholesale 
funding. 
Capital adequacy ratio is a standard proxy for the creditworthiness of the bank. 
Capital adequacy rules are set by the regulator with the aim of preventing banks 
from accepting too much risk and ensuring banking sector stability (Claeys and 
Vander Vennet, 2008), although the actual level of capital adequacy that bank 
maintains is a result of combination of factors (regulation, market pressures, busi-
ness strategy of the bank). Expected sign of relationship between net interest mar-
gin and capital adequacy ratio can go both ways, depending on the magnitude of 
transfer of these factors to clients. According to Saunders and Schumacher (2000), 
it is expected that banking systems with lower regulatory costs (such as reserve 
and capital requirements) have narrower margins. 
An additional measure of regulatory costs is a ratio of bank reserves held at the 
central bank and M3. It is expected that countries with higher costs of regulation 
will have more reserves placed with the central bank. We are aware that such a 
measure has some drawbacks but we believe that in the studied period it is a good 
proxy for regulatory costs in the CEE countries. 
The influence of non-performing loans on the net interest margins is measured by 
the coverage of impaired loans with reserves. The rise in the share of non-perfo-
rming loans and increased reservations for bad loans hurt bank’s profitability, 
especially during the crisis. International accounting standards (IAS 39) stipulate 
that the interest on the loan that is impaired is accrued only on the recoverable 
amount5.  Provisions for bad loans can also be used as tool for income smoothing, 
where in good times provisions are on a level higher than the expected loss and in 
bad times they are underrated, as documented by Fonesca and Gonzales (2008). 
Consequently, the link between nonperforming loans and net interest margin 
might be ambiguous. 
The influence of market structure on the net interest margin is measured by the 
share of the three largest banks in total assets of the banking sector. A more con-
centrated banking market might imply higher margins for all banks in the market 
as banks exploit their market power. 
In order to measure the macroeconomic conditions in the banks’ environment we 
use GDP growth, inflation, share of current account deficit in GDP and share of 
general government debt in GDP. Level of short term interest rates in the economy 
measures the stance of the economic policy. As an alternative, we estimate a spe-
cification that includes only yield spread on comparable government eurobonds 
from the observed countries and German government bond instead of a full set of 
macroeconomic indicators. This approach was motivated by findings presented in 
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11part of the literature on the determinants of emerging market bond spreads show-
ing that the bond spreads include information about macroeconomic developments 
and other available information (Ferrucci, 2003; Alexopoulou, Bunda and Fer-
rando, 2009; Özatay, Özmen and Sahinbeyoglu, 2009). This specification also 
serves as the robustness check. Due to data availability, in this part of analysis 
time dimension for some countries is shortened. 
4 stylized facts
The median net interest margin for the sampled banks has been steadily decrea-
sing during the studied period, indicating falling costs of financial intermediation. 
In the period prior to 2008 countries in the sample experienced relatively high 
rates of GDP growth combined with on average high capital inflows (measured by 
relatively high current account deficits) and were marked by high credit growth 
rates. Since 2008, as the crisis hit, GDP growth and capital inflows decreased si-
gnificantly, together with credit activity (figure 1). Government debt to GDP in-
creased from the beginning of the sample, especially after the onset of the crisis.
figure 1 













1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Median net interest margin Median current account deficit Median GDP growth
Median credit growth (right) General government debt to GDP ratio (right)
Source: Bankscope, Eurostat, own calculations.
Regarding bank specific variables, it should be noted that our sample starts in the 
year 1999, when the banking sector consolidation in CEE gained momentum (Ka-
sman et al., 2010) and foreign investors had already become very important play-
ers in the CEE banking market. This process was marked by significant cost cut-
ting and improved efficiency. The share of reserves for impaired loans, which was 
somewhat higher at the beginning of the sample (due to the Russian crisis and the 
still relatively underdeveloped bank management in the 1990s), gradually fell as 
assets grew. Similarly, the capital adequacy ratio for the median bank fell, im-
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12 After the onset of the crisis, reserves for impaired loans increased as the share of 
nonperforming loans rose significantly and capitalization increased as banks and 
regulators started building safety nets (figures 2 and 3).
figure 2 
















1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Median net interest margin Reserves for impaired loans to gross loans (median)
Median cost to income ratio (right)
Source: Bankscope, own calculations.
figure 3 
Net interest margin and capital adequacy ratio (%)













Median net interest margin Capitalization (right)
Source: Bankscope, own calculations.
In the pre-crisis period the standard deviation of net interest margin across banks 
was relatively low and increased significantly after it. This indicates that, after a 
period of relative tranquility in the CEE banking industry, the ongoing financial 
crisis and recession brought about diversification as a result of an accumulation of 
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13figure 4 
Standard deviation of net interest margin (%)







Source: Bankscope; own calculations.
Finally, the share of non-interest income in gross revenue for the CEE banks fell 
significantly in the post 2008 period. This is probably due to the fact that various 
charges were linked with the credit granting process (figure 5) and as the credit 
activity dried out, this had an impact on non-interest income as well. 
figure 5 
Credit growth and noninterest income to gross revenue (%)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010



















Source: Bankscope; own calculations.
Based on these observations, the main hypotheses on the determinants of interest 
rate margins can be formulated as follows:
1) Favourable macroeconomic conditions and high capital inflows are correla-
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14 2) Among bank specific variables, increased efficiency, decreasing capitaliza-
tion and reserves for impaired loans are linked with lower net interest mar-
gins.
5 methodology
The data generating process is assumed to be defined by:
yi,t = αyi,t-1 + x’it β + εi,t
εi,t = μi+ vi,t
E[μi] = E[vi,t] = E[μivi,t] = 0.
The subscripts i and t are for the bank and year respectively. 
Net interest margin is represented by yi,t, x is the matrix of explanatory variables 
presented in table 1. Some variables in matrix x are country specific, i.e. they are 
the same for all banks from a given country. The error term has two orthogonal 
components, fixed effects μi and idiosyncratic shocks vi,t.
The combination of a relatively short time period, the use of a lagged dependent 
variable, bank specific fixed effects and possible endogeneity problems with bank 
specific variables make the use of least squares unfeasible as the estimates are not 
consistent. Using OLS with fixed effects and lagged dependent variable gives rise 
to dynamic panel bias (see Nickel, 1981; or Roodman, 2006) because the lagged 
dependent variable is correlated with error term by construction.6
Our data set has a large cross section and relatively small time dimension, so the 
problems mentioned above can be solved by using the Arellano and Bover (1995) 
system GMM estimator. This estimator uses lagged levels of dependent variable 
and orthogonal deviations of other endogenous variables as instruments. By using 
orthogonal transformations it allows for the use of a lagged dependent variable as 
an explanatory variable. Consequently, we estimate the equation (1) using Arellano 
and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator. We treat all bank specific variables 
from table 1 as endogenous and instrument them with their orthogonal transfo-
rmations. 
6 empirical results and robustness
The estimated model is 
6 Modifying an example of Roodman (2006), consider a company × year panel and a firm that has a large 
negative temporary shock to its employment in one period. As a result fixed effect for this firm for all years 
will be lower. If the shock happens in time t, in time t+1 the lagged dependent variable is lower together with 
fixed effect. This positive correlation between error term and regressor violates the consistency assumption 
by inflating the coefficient estimate for lagged dependent variable.
(1)
(2)
yi,t = αyi,t-1 + x’it ∙βBS + w’it∙βBM + z’it∙βM + εi,t
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15The three vectors of variables represent the banks-specific (xi,t), banking market-
specific (wi,t) and macroeconomic variables (zi,t) described in table 1 and yi,t repre-
sents the net interest margin. Subscripts i and t are for i-th bank and t-th time pe-
riod. Error term has a bank-specific (µi) and a time-specific part (tt), which are 
controlled for in the estimation.7 Finally, the dot operator (.) represents element by 
element multiplication. 
The estimation results are presented in table 2. Equation 2 is in the first step esti-
mated for the whole sample period (specification 1). As a robustness test, we per-
form structural break tests by using the form of Chow test for GMM estimated 
equations, the Andrews and Fair (1988) test. The existence of a possible break is 
tested in 2007 and 2008. For both years the test finds insufficient evidence against 
hypothesis H0 of parameter stability.
8 To test for the possible breaks in some spe-
cific parameters we use a dummy variable named CRISIS which equals 1 in years 
2008, 2009 and 2010 and zero otherwise. 
The results of our baseline specification show that there is a relatively high persi-
stence of net interest margin across time, as the coefficient with the lagged net 
interest margin is relatively high and significant (specification 1, table 2). This 
justifies the inclusion of lagged values of net interest margin in the estimated re-
gressions. 
All included macroeconomic indicators proved to be statistically significantly lin-
ked to the net interest margin, meaning that the environment in which banks ope-
rate significantly influences their performance. The link between GDP growth and 
net interest margin is positive, implying that periods of high growth can result in 
higher net interest margins due to more intense credit activity and better loan qua-
lity, as noted by Claeys and Vander Vennet (2004) (it should be noted though that 
the p value for the GDP growth is 0.051 in specification 1 and that is insignificant 
at standard levels in specification 2). According to the presented results, the rela-
tively big capital inflows that CEE countries experienced in the observed period 
(measured by current account deficit) had a positive effect on the cost of financial 
intermediation. The results show that higher capital inflows were linked with on 
average a lower net interest margin charged by the banks. In contrast, the correla-
tion of general government debt and net interest margin is on average positive, 
implying that government debt accumulation increases the net interest margin, 
probably due to increased macroeconomic risks and the potential unsustainability. 
Inflation is positively correlated with net interest margin, in line with the findings 
in the studied literature, while the relation between interest rates and interest mar-
gins is negative. 
7 The significance of time specific fixed effects was tested using the Wald test after GMM estimation. The 
significance of bank specific fixed effects was done applying the Hausman test after fixed effects regre ssion. 
Both tests show strong evidence against the null hypothesis which states that the effects are equal to 0.
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16 table 2 
Estimation results
equation name Specifications
1 2 3 4 5
Dependent 
variable net interest margin


























































Ratio of reserves 





















































Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 823 824 858 640 506
Banks 152 152 153 131 122
Periods 12 12 12 10 8
Hansen J statistics 84.49 76.65 81.38 78.87 71.05
p value 0.1307 0.2738 0.2873 0.2707 0.2547
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets, all estimators are of panel GMM system types, 
Arellano and Bover (1995). Hansen J statistics and p value are for Hansen test for overiden-
tifying restrictions.
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17Among the bank-specific variables, most of the coefficients have the expected 
signs. The cost to income ratio is negatively correlated with net interest margin, 
implying that relatively less efficient banks marked by higher cost to income ratio 
had higher net interest margins, as concluded by the most of the analysed authors 
(table A1). The ratio of non-interest income to gross revenue is significant and 
negative suggesting that banks with a higher share of non-interest income in their 
gross revenues charged lower margins for loans granted and collected additional 
revenue through various charges connected to credit activity. Reserves for impai-
red loans are significantly negatively correlated with net interest margin. This 
most probably stems from the fact that the banks are not allowed to accrue interest 
on bad loans. The only unexpected result in this specification is that the capitali-
zation ratio is not significant. As many other researchers find evidence of this link 
(i.e. Claeys and Vander Vennet, 2008 for the CEE countries), we test for the poten-
tial structural break in this relationship. By interacting the aforementioned crisis 
dummy with total capitalization ratio we get specific estimates for the partial cor-
relation of capitalization with net interest margin in the pre-crisis and crisis pe-
riods (specification 2, table 2). The results show that there is a structural change in 
the relationship between total capitalization ratio and net interest margin. The 
partial correlation between total capitalization ratio and net interest margin is ne-
gative and much higher in the crisis period, implying that increasing capital du-
ring the crisis can be very costly for the bank. 
As robustness check we estimated several modified specifications. In the third 
specification macro variables are excluded (specification 3, table 2), while in the 
fourth specification all macro variables are replaced with the yield spread on go-
vernment bonds acting as synthetic macro variable (specification 4). In this speci-
fication Slovenia and Estonia fall out of the sample because there are no compara-
ble data on the yield spreads available for these countries. Also, the data for Slo-
vakia have missing values in years 2009 and 2010. The fifth specification includes 
a regulatory cost variable (specification 5) that is also not available for Slovenia 
and Estonia and has missing values for the majority of countries in the period 
before 2003. In this shortened sample (specifications 4 and 5) the ratio of loans to 
customer deposits becomes significant, implying that banks that had fewer depo-
sits in their funding mix charged a somewhat higher margin. Additionally, the 
coefficient on the total capitalization ratio in the pre-crisis period in these specifi-
cations (specifications 4 and 5) is positive, albeit the value is small. Finally, we 
should note the concentration ratio is significant in some specifications (specifica-
tions 3 and 4) but it is not robust as it changes signs. 
Regarding additional regressors in specifications 4 and 5, two results seek special 
attention. Firstly, the yield spread variable included in specification 4 shows that 
increased country risk is linked to higher cost of financial intermediation. This 
corroborates results of other specifications where macroeconomic risks are on 
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18 Secondly, the correlation of regulatory costs and net interest margin is negative 
(specification 5), however this relationship is not statistically significant. 
We have also performed robustness test that splits sample in two parts: highly 
euroized economies (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Slovenia prior to eurozone entry) vs. others. The Andrews-Fair (1988) test statistic 
is 16.62, which is less that critical value of 37.65 for 5% significance level. 
In sum, we can conclude that the estimation results showed to be robust in these 
tests. The statistical significance of the coefficients remains the same across spe-
cifications and their sizes do not change significantly.
7 conclusion
In this research we analyzed the main net interest margin determinants of banks 
operating in Central and Eastern European countries from 1999 to 2010. We used 
the Arellano and Bover (1995) system GMM estimator which is robust to endoge-
neity problems and allows for the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable toge-
ther with fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. 
The results imply there have been several main drivers of decline in net interest 
margins in CEE in the pre-crisis period. Prior to 2008 the net interest margins 
declined primarily due to strong capital inflows, a stable macroeconomic envi-
ronment (low inflation and low short term interest rates) and a fall in the share of 
nonperforming loans in the balance sheets of the banks. On the other hand, the 
economic boom (relatively high GDP growth rates) and rising government debt 
allowed banks to charge somewhat higher margins due to high demand for credit. 
In the crisis period, rapidly increasing government debt and the associated incre-
ase in macroeconomic risks together with declining capital inflows were propping 
up margins while other factors such as low demand (due to weak economic per-
formance), higher capitalization and significantly increased share of non-perfo-
rming loans pressured banks’ margins down. 
The results of the estimation also show that throughout the studied period increa-
sed efficiency in the CEE banking sector has led to lower margins. The important 
implication of this result for banks’ management is that the banks which are not 
able to lower their costs (and margins) will lose their competitive position and 
subsequently market share.
When looking at the possible manoeuvring space for policy makers’ actions that 
could affect the costs of financial intermediation and in turn interest rates, and 
therefore indirectly support economic activity our results indicate that a stable 
macroeconomic environment and significant capital inflows support lower net in-
terest margins. On the other hand increasing government debt and associated ma-
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19opinion, pressures by the regulators to increase capital during the crisis will result 
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27table a3 
Panel unit root test results
Variable name levin, liu & chu 
(2002)
Im, Pesaran and 
shin (2003)
Net interest margin (%) I(0) I(0)
Cost to income ratio (%) I(0) I(0)
Ratio of noninterest revenue to gross revenue (%) I(0) I(0)
Total capital ratio I(0) I(0)
Ratio of loans to customer deposits I(0) I(0)
Ratio of reserves for impaired loans to impaired loans I(0) I(1)
Concentration I(0) I(0)
3 month money market rate I(0) I(0)
GDP growth I(0) I(0)
Inflation I(0) I(0)
Current account I(1) I(0)
Government debt I(0) I(1)
Growth rate of gross loans I(0) I(0)
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